T his age in which we are living is characterized by rapidly increasing biotechnological knowledge; and revolutionary techniques involving assisted reproductive technologies, pre-natal diag noses, genetics, and cloning. Significantly, these not only affect current humanity, but also provide choices about what types of humans will be born in the future. How "dif ference" is conceptualized within such a context must be subject to ongoing ethical and legal scrutiny; and the relationship be tween bioethics and people with intellectual disability exemplifies such a challenge. This discussion explores some initial observations of such a relationship.
Explorations thus far have revealed two significant contentions. First, people or potential people with intellectual disability are most likely to be rendered, even on bio logical determination alone, profoundly irrelevant or disqualified within bioethical conversations because they are deemed in capable o f being rational, competent, independent beings (Clapton, 2000 (Clapton, ,1999 . (Continued on p a g e 2)
woes would soon be resolved! In this debate no one speaks of the elimination o f people with disabilities, but, rather, of the elimination of "disability", and the "suffering" with which it is assumed to be associated. Normally, this is taken, uncritically, to be positive, but is such a position sustainable? Without adopting some idealized notion of disability, what alternative perspectives m ight be proposed? Can advances in genetics ever benefit people with disabilities? These were some o f the questions considered in invited and submitted p resen ta tio n s from g en eticists, philosophers, social scientists, lawyers, representatives o f groups for people with genetic "syndromes", clinicians in services for people with intellectual disabilities, and researchers.
It soon became clear that the popular representations o f the Human Genome Project far outstrip the reality. A t the tim e o f the m eeting, the sequencing of the human genome was only in "draft form", and not, as had been suggested in the press, complete. DNA sequences have been identified for only about 12,000 o f the 30,000 to 35,000 genes that make up the coding sequences in the human genome (HG).While a target date for com pletion o f the sequencing o f the HG has been set for the end of 2002, this is only the beginning of main task. Only when the much longer term work of the investigation of the functional roles of each gene has been completed is it likely that there will be a conceptual advance in understanding.
Meanwhile, however, the process of identifying genes leading to specific syndromes associated with "disability" is a reality. What then about prenatal diagnosis and choice? As options increase, should choice be limited through the law, and if so, how? At present the assumption that a person's life will necessarily include "suffering", perhaps inevitably leads to a positive view of the opportunities that already exist as a result o f the new genetics for the option o f It soon became clear that the popular representations of the Human Genome Project far outstrip the reality.
termination of pregnancy, as well as optimism about the new options that may soon be a re a lity w ith resp ect to " em bryo p reim p lan tatio n " . An alternative view is that there is no ineluctable link between suffering and a condition associated with a disability, such as Down Syndrome. Rather, suffering may simply be part of the human experience and the possession of three copies of chromosome 21 may, in some circumstances, play little role in this. Individual beliefs, in the context of societal attitudes, may be o f more importance. Professor John Harris, the philosopher, argued strongly that we should seek offspring who, at least at the start of their lives, have no preventable disadvantage. Developing this argument further, he proposed that it is morally unjustifiable to make a free choice to have a baby with a disability: it is wrong to bring avoidable suffering into the world. This is not to deny choice; on the | contrary, people are entitled to make their own decisions about their offspring. But for potential parents to choose not to prevent disability in their offspring, at present through genetic counseling and termination, would be similar to denying potential treatment to their son or daughter with congenital deafness. Rationally, we must prefer to avoid a "harmed condition". The important issue for debate lies around what are, and are not, acceptable reproductive choices?
Other presentations examined the issues raised by John Harris in more detail, and from different perspectives. One view is that advances in genetics lead inevitably to a better understanding o f disability and the potential for the suffering with which it is associated. However, while different interventions and treatments might be developed in the future, at present, prevention is the main option, and that should be a priority. From a m ore critical p erspective, the construction of "disability" in a particular socio-historical contexts, the relationship between disability and individual identity, and the meaning o f "suffering", often conceptualize w ithin a contentious fram ew ork o f "tragedy" or "catastrophe", were questioned. Men and women working in genetic research have to believe in their methods of classification, and in their models of understanding of intellect and behavior, as much as those who challenge the genetic deterministic perspective, have to believe in the "unconditionality of human relationships".
We hope that the participants who attended this m eeting came away enriched, not least by the opportunity to share tim e w ith others w hose perspectives are so different from their own, but also in terms o f what was decided and of the outcome -what was decided and what was the outcome is more difficult to answer. The styles of discourse, the knowledge bases of different disciplines, personal experience and preconceptions, and the cultural contexts in which we work, are so different. How do we develop the arguments, and how do we share an understanding? Discussion and debate must be the way forward, but that will continue to be a challenge at a time when "sound-bites" are valued and reflection and complexity receives limited attention. And how can we involve people with intellectual disabilities themselves and their fam ilies, the " experts by experience", in this debate?
Genetic research will continue to advance, and there is the real potential for benefit, but this continues against a background of long-established fears of disability. Other contributions at the meeting reminded us that the forced sterilization, primarily of women, still takes place, that the goal of autonomy for adults remains problematic, and that the lived experience o f people with intellectual disabilities and their families often remains one of disadvantage and exclusion.
We w ould like to thank the Nuffield Foundation and the Wellcome Trust in the UK for their financial support, and the support from Professor Hans Reinders.
Tony Holland and Isabel Clare work in the Section o f Developmental P sychiatry o f the D epartm ent o f Psychiatry, University o f Cambridge, UK.
(Continued from p a g e 1)
standing of disablement from dominant medical perspectives about individual deficits, to social theories that focus upon the structures of an excluding society to those considered "not normal", there has been little recognition of these changes in bioethics literature. Furthermore, one could readily claim that against this para doxical backdrop, the contemporary biotechnological era is, in fact, facilitat ing the recolonization of the lives of people with disability by powerful disci plines such as medicine, science and the law, with the complicit support of moral philosophy.
That is because the complex rela tionship between bioethics and disability in Western society is predominantly con stituted by conjoining two powerful relations: disability is perceived as per sonal tragedy; and ethics, especially bioethics, is predominantly practiced as traditional medical ethics. In this context, disability is viewed either as a distress ing or disastrous situation or as an undesirable "problem" to be fixed or eliminated. The focus then, is on the al leviation of presumed unhappiness and suffering; Bioethics, as a discipline, is thus primarily committed to ameliorating the state of "not-good", or preventing "notright'' ways of being human.
In deconstructing the conjunction of disability as personal tragedy and bioet hics as traditional medical ethics, I contend that we need to explore the controlling discourses o f tragedy and catastrophe in order to recognize inher ent complexities about whose voices are being heard and whose agendas are be ing considered. In this context, tragedy can be defined as an unhappy event in real life with disastrous and sorrowful conclusions; catastrophe is a sudden di saster due to the disruption of the social order.
Identification of these discourses as sists in differentiating between how dominant private and public concerns and agendas are conceived. For instance, tragedy is a discourse o f the private arena, in which individual ethical choices are made in particular situations such as a clinical encounter. The presence of dis ability as a tragedy evokes personal, autonomous choices that are directed by such principles as beneficence and nonmaleficence, compassion, and mercy that seek to prevent or diminish the pos sibility of suffering and pain. Ultimately, it seems that the responses need to be determined by those who will be affected by such choices, and who will utilize While a discourse of tragedy consid ers an explanation, a discourse of catastrophe seeks a cause, and thus shifts the focus to political and research actions to alleviate societal burden.
forms of knowledge and information of fered to them, most likely by "expert", in order to make their personal decisions. In doing this, they juxtapose this input with their own past, present, and pre sumptions o f future experiences to inform them in relation to assessing notions o f unhappiness, suffering, dependency, and burden.
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On the other hand, catastrophe is the discourse o f the public arena with its context o f social order. Therefore, ethical considerations are expanded from those o f personal choice to soci etal concerns. The p resen ce o f disability, as a discourse of catastrophe, represents an intersection of moral, po litical and economic considerations; and anathema to what is considered "good" according to an established social or der. While a discourse o f tragedy considers an explanation, a discourse of catastrophe seeks a cause, and thus shifts the focus to political and research actions to alleviate societal burden.
This agenda is illum inated by Dreger, who interestingly highlights how the American political context has de picted the Human Genome Project as a "dramatic morality play." In this "play," she describes how scientists have been depicted as frontier explor ers on journeys o f discovery; with the territory then being claimed and mapped as a road map to good health; thus lead ing to subsequent claims that it would be immoral or unethical not to carry on with the Project and; then consequently using language and tropes o f hunting the "bad" genes; and more recently, even to engaging in real estate practices of commodifying and trading the territory (Dreger, 2000) . Such a construction presents some intriguing similarities to processes of colonization. It is pertinent to note these insights with Sibley's de scrip tio n o f how the h isto ry o f colonialism, the rise of science, and the growth o f capitalism have led to the "scaling ofbeings" by dominant groups, which subject presumed inferior beings to processes of exclusion or dispens ability (Sibley 1995, p.27) . The possible presence o f intellectual disability, the inferior social status afforded to those affected, and the notion o f societal bur den seemingly underpin the promotion of prevention procedures such as pre implantation or pre-natal testing and the . . . ethical considerations are expanded from those of personal choice to societal concerns.
tendency towards the use o f thera peutic abortions. In the public context, where disability is viewed as undesir able, scientists and clinicians are socially constructed and presented, usually with the support o f the political arena, as vir tuous pioneers and Salvationists who carry the responsibility of not only cre ating better humans, but also enhanced societies.
Therefore, discourses o f tragedy and catastrophe present implicit and un questioned understandings that are more likely to reflect the ethical practices of practitioners, clinicians, technicians, and ethicists. It is their works that are as sessed in light of their assumed goodness, that is, for their capacity to respond n o rm at i v el y to the presumed themes of imbued unhappiness, suffering, burden, dependency, incompetency, undesirabil ity, irrelevance, and the need to control the possibility of dependent others.
However, I argue that the relation ship between bioethics and intellectual disability must be confronted to shift ethi cal understanding from the presumed tragedy of impaired bodies, to consider the impact of impaired theorizing.
The evocation o f tragedy and ca tastrophe discourses in relation to intellectual disability and biotechnologic a l advances such as the Human Ge nome Project is contentious in as much as these discourses fail to embrace what Hilde Lindemann Nelson (1995) refers to as " c o u n te rsto rie s." "Counterstories" o f real lived and rela tional experiences with people with intellectual disability can offer both al ternative understandings that challenge notions o f inferiority, and ethical plat forms from which to engage in critical discussions. I argue, then, that the chal lenge ahead will be to address some pertinent questions, such as "Can these counterstories be heard in such a bio technological climate o f science and industry" and "What currency will bio ethics, as a discipline, give them against the very powerful and colonizing disci plines controlling the biotechnological revolution." It seems that these are questions that urgently require address ing when considering disability, suffering, and moral status in the age o f the Hu man Genome Project. The aim o f the Human Genome Project is to identify the linear sequence of DNA which constitutes the genetic m aterial o f a hum an being. The assumption is that having this knowledge will facilitate our understanding o f the human condition both in its normal and diseased state and thus guide our efforts to identify and potentially ameliorate diseases. With respect to intellectual disability the project assumes a medical model o f disability and so far has confined its study to identifying single genes that are likely to cause intellectual d isa b ility w hen abnorm al in an individual. These genes are rare, but if found, have a high predictive value for its effect in an individual. Two overall strategies have been used to identify these genes which:
• Identify rare families where the intellectual disability alone runs in the family. Most o f these have an X-linked pattern o f inheritance w here m ales are affected preferentially and carried through females who are either mildly affected or unaffected. The first of these conditions to be identified was fragile X syndrom e and more recently seven more genes on the X chrom osom e have been iden tified that correlate w ith intellectual disability. All the single genes responsible for intellectual disability through this mechanism are rare and, even where a gene abnormality is detected, the extent of the disability is very variable. • Focus on diseases or syndromes where affected individuals have a characteristic physical form and intellectual disability is only part of the overall clinical manifestations of the conditions. Examples are Prader Willi, Williams, Smith Magenis, Coffin Lowry and X-linked alpha thalassaem ia syndrom es. The id e n tificatio n o f the genetic abnormality has been technically easier as samples from affected individuals with common clinical features can be grouped together experimentally and assumed to have a similar molecular abnormality. Again the presence o f a genetic abnormality in these individuals strongly pred icts intellectual disability although the extent of the disability varies among individuals with the same condition.
One can envisage potential benefits in identifying the genetic causes of learning disability in an individual in both clinical and research contexts.
• M olecular characterization o f co n d itio n s asso ciated w ith intellectual disability has enabled grouping o f similarly affected individuals and has facilitated understanding o f the specific d isab ility asso ciated w ith a condition. This has helped, and will increasingly help, in identifying specific educational and medical needs for certain groups of patients and accurate advice to affected individuals and their carers.
• M olecular genetic testing can provide an explanation as to the cause of intellectual disability in an individual. Parents frequently seek to find an explanation for why their child has problems. Identifying g en etic ab n o rm alities can potentially reduce the burden for responsibility o f causation that m any parents feel, although, complex feelings o f guilt about unknowingly handing on genes that lead to disease should not be underestimated.
• Accurate molecular information now ensures accurate advice about recurrence is now tailored to individual families. Previously only empirical recurrence risks were available from population-based observations. These are composite figures made from a few families where the recurrence is high and many more fam ilies were the recurrence is low due to a different disease causing mechanism.
• Prenatal testing becomes possible in a subsequent pregnancy where there is a recurrence risk. This choice becom es av ailab le to couples who previously had no choice. If the genetic abnormality is identified, the choice now in subsequent pregnancies is: a) prenatal testing early in pregnancy and a termination of pregnancy if the second child is affected; b) prenatal testing and preparation for the birth of a second affected child; and c) the choice to have no prenatal testing. • Molecular genetics has the potential to provide understanding o f some o f the cellular mechanisms that underlie abnormal brain development and thus increase our knowledge of this complex process.
There are also p erceiv ed disadvantages of studying the molecular mechanisms underlying intellectual disability. Some of these concerns are:
• Identification of molecular genetic abnormalities that lead to intellectual disability reinforces a medical model of disability, which is unacceptable 6 to many. It raises questions of when genetic variation is an abnormality and when it is a normal variant.
• It also reinforces many ideas of genetic determinism and easily becomes generalized inappropriately to all intellectual abilities.
• Identifying gene abnormalities may generate choices for parents with resp ect to p ren atal testin g . Previously if there was no choice then individuals did not have to enter the debate of the morals and ethics o f termination o f pregnancy for intellectual disability and the co n seq u en t effect on those individuals in society who were not t e r m in a t e d . T h is d e b a te is qualitatively identical to that stimulated by prenatal testing for Down's syndrome.
With the progress o f the Human Genome Project there are concerns that if all genetic abnormalities could be detected we would inevitably slide into an era o f designer babies without realizing it. This is a real concern and needs to be considered. However, the ability to predict the level of intellectual disability from genetic information is limited to a few genes, that when abnormal, cause profound intellectual disability. These gene abnormalities are rare in the population but highly significant in the few affected families. Even in these fam ilies there is considerable heterogeneity and range of disability, which is thought to be due to influences both by the external environment and by internal influence of other genes within that individual. In general, m ost genes and genetic variation are poor predictors of disease and would never be useful in predicting the level o f intellectual disability in an individual except in these rare cases. I would therefore argue that, apart from identifying the rare, highly penetrant genes w here a m edical model o f disability would seem more acceptable, genetic testing of low-penetrant genes, which are a poor predictor of intellectual disability, would neither be accurate, or desirable. It is encouraging that this is also the view of the general public in surveys o f UK attitudes to genetics.
The Human Genome Project and the identification o f genes involved in intellectual ability continues. We have the opportunity to understand some of the molecular mechanisms o f learning disability in individuals and provide in sig h ts into the b eh av io ral characteristics of these conditions. As this knowledge emerges over the next few years, it is imperative that it is used appropriately for the benefit o f those with intellectual disability so that their lives are enriched by this knowledge rather than simply excluded. *Dr. F. Lucy Raymond is University Lecturer and Honorary Consultant in Medical Genetics at the University of Cambridge, UK. Atkins has an I.Q. of 59 and the mental age of a 9-12 year old. Testimony by the two forensic clinical psychologists con flicted as to whether Atkins was mildly mentally retarded or at least average in intelligence; both experts, however, agreed that Atkins had the ability both to understand his criminal conduct and to act in accordance with the law. The Su preme Court o f Virginia found it significant that the diagnosis of mental retardation involves more than the deter mination of I.Q. and that it involves consideration of "adaptive functioning," the ability to live independently. Although a jury twice sentenced Atkins to death for the crime, two of the five state su preme court judges dissented on assigning the death penalty to mentally retarded de fendants. The U.S. Supreme Court will hear oral argument on the Atkins case in spring 2002 and decide the case later in the term before July. 
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